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Open justice, efficient justice and the rule of law: the increasing invisibility of special leave 
to appeal applications in the High Court of Australia 
Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke* 
This article examines the application of the rule of law to special leave to appeal applications 
(SLAs) in the High Court of Australia.   SLAs are a fusion of administrative and judicial power.  
As an administrative tool, determinations of SLAs are a workload filter, limiting the appeals 
heard by the Court.  As an exercise of judicial power, SLA determinations have significant 
impact upon the parties to litigation and the development of substantive law.  Presenting the 
findings of data analysis of the determination of SLAs in the High Court of Australia from 2013-
2015, we identify the loss of publicly available information brought about by changes to the 
High Court Rules in 2016. Using this evidence we argue that the current administration of SLAs 
preferences efficiency to the detriment of public confidence in the administration of justice.  
We suggest facilitating the rule of law through publication of the written submissions for SLAs. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article argues for increased transparency in the determination of special leave to appeal 
applications1 (SLAs) in the High Court of Australia.  Referencing the rule of law principles of 
open justice and efficient justice, we suggest that the current administration of SLAs 
preferences efficiency to the detriment of public confidence in the administration of justice.2 
SLAs are a fusion of administrative and judicial functions. Administratively, the High Court 
utilises the process of special leave to control its own workload.3  It selects the cases it will 
hear on appeal in accordance with the public interest test in section 35A Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth). As the grant or refusal of special leave is a ‘virtually unfettered’4 discretion, written 
reasons are not given and determinations may be made by a panel of any 2 Justices. This is 
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1 The focus of this article is upon special leave to appeal applications (SLAs) rather than leave to appeal.  The 
latter are rare as such appeals concern judgments of Justices exercising the High Court’s original jurisdiction. 
2 Note the difference here between administration and the administration of justice, the former is an 
administrative function and the latter is a judicial function: Hon Justice Kiefel, ‘Judicial Independence’ 
(Conference Paper, North Queensland Law Association, 30 May 2008). 
3  The number of substantive appeals the Court hears annually is around 80: David O’Brien, Special Leave to 
Appeal (Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2nd ed, 2007). This number is confirmed by this study, of the 
783 SLAs 80 or 10% were granted and 703 or 90% refused (see Part V).  This is not unique to the High Court see 
Roy B Flemming, Granting Judicial Review in Canada (UBC Press, 2003) for the discussion of the Canadian 
Supreme Court and 102-104 for a brief overview of other international courts. 
4  Hon Ian Callinan, ‘An over-mighty court’ in Upholding the Australian Constitution (Proceedings of the Fourth 
Conference of the Samuel Griffith Society 1994) 81113.  
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efficient justice. SLAs are also an exercise of Commonwealth Constitutional judicial power. 
Determinations of special leave affect both the rights of parties and the development of 
substantive law, allowing the High Court to select and determine which questions of law 
require judicial consideration. The outcomes of SLAs are disseminated in the High Court 
Annual Reports, in published Special Leave Dispositions and in the transcripts of SLAs heard 
orally. Parties’ written submissions for final appeal hearings (though not SLAs) are publicly 
available on the High Court website. This is open justice.  
We make the case for increased transparency in the determination of SLAs firstly, by engaging 
with the rule of law and the open justice jurisprudence of the High Court and secondly, by 
examining the exceptionalism of SLAs.  Tension between efficient justice and open justice, 
both of which are critical to the rule of law,5 is resolved by the express jurisprudential 
preference of the High Court for efficiency in determining SLAs. Utilising the results of a data 
study of High Court SLAs from 2013-2015, we demonstrate the reduction in publicly available 
information about SLAs as a result of the High Court Rule changes in 2016 governing the filing 
and determination of SLAs and leave to appeal applications.6  These changes to Part 41 of the 
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth)7 reflect the practical necessity to control the ever increasing 
volume of work funnelled to the High Court8 through streamlining procedures and reducing9 
oral hearings of SLAs.10  Finally, acknowledging limited Court resources, we suggest enhancing 
the rule of law through making publicly available all SLA submissions by parties (subject to 
any Court imposed restrictions), redressing the growing imbalance between efficient justice 
and open justice. 
This article makes three important contributions.  First, the findings provide empirical 
evidence of the machinery of the SLA process. It is the first study to collate, synthesize and 
analyse data to highlight the impact of the 2016 Rule changes with respect to the manner in 
which applications are managed and determined by the High Court.11 Second, consideration 
of jurisprudence and literature concerning the rule of law and open justice demonstrates the 
link between the administrative role of the court and the complexity of the judicial role, 
                                                          
5 Hon Wayne Martin AC, ‘Court Administrators and the Judiciary – Partners in the Delivery of Justice’ (2014) 
6(2) International Journal for Court Administration 3. 
6 Andrew Phelan, ‘Changes to High Court procedures for considering applications for special leave’, Chief 
Executive and Principal Registrar of the High Court of Australia, 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/corporate/policies/Special_Leave_Changes.pdf>;    High Court Amendment 
(2016 Measures No. 1) Rules 2016 (Cth); High Court Amendment (2016 Measures No. 2) Rules 2016 (Cth). 
7 Subsection 21(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides that special leave will be determined subject to the 
Rules.  
8 This necessity is not new, almost 60 years ago Justice McClemens noted that ‘... for purely pragmatic reasons 
some thought may have to be given in the future to some form of limitation of appeals to the High Court from 
State courts’, Justice McClemens, ‘Judicial Problems in a Growing State’ (1960) 3 Sydney Law Review 221, 232.   
9 A new form (Form 23) now consolidates the draft Notice of Appeal and the Summary of argument/written 
case into a single form for both leave to appeal and special leave to appeal.     
10 High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 44.08.2 and the new form (Form 27F) which states the outline of oral 
submissions. The High Court may now grant leave without an oral hearing see Michael Pelly, ‘High Court 
decides leave applications on paper’ The Australian, 22 July 2016. 
11 This article complements other published findings of this study as to the substance of SLAs, including  
parties, legal representation, nature of cases, main issues on appeal:  Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, 
‘Litigants and Legal Representatives: A Study of Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia’ 
(2019) 41(1) Sydney Law Review 34.   
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whereas previous empirical work using quantitative material alone has been criticised for: 
measuring performance;12 reflecting upon the quality of the work of justices; or explaining 
judicial efficiency.13  Instead our analysis supplements qualitative evaluation14 by raising 
awareness as to the manner the Court undertakes its work. Third, we extend commentary on 
the adequacy of Court resourcing15 and the need for public confidence and transparency of 
Court processes16 with respect to the loss of publicly available information through the 2016 
Rule changes. We suggest that while the movement towards paper only determinations is not 
itself problematic, the loss of publicly available information is. In summary, the value of our 
analysis is to open for scrutiny the type or kind of work the Court is being asked to do through 
SLAs and the way in which it seeks to manage that work.   
II THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA: THE RULE OF LAW, OPEN JUSTICE AND THE OPEN 
COURT RULE 
The rule of law, that all members of a society are equally subject to publicly available legal 
codes and processes,17 is an overarching principle of the Australian democratic system of 
government.18  The rule of law opposes the exercise of arbitrary power. In Albert Venn Dicey’s 
oft-cited formulation the rule of law ‘excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, 
or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government’.19 This exclusion of 
arbitrary power is both aspirational and formal: aspirational as it is an ideal of justice and 
formal as the constitutional role of the courts is to hold the Executive to account and to act 
as a balance against legislative supremacy.20  
                                                          
12 Described as an ‘infant science’ see Hon Murray Gleeson, ‘Current Issues for the Australian Judiciary’ 
(Conference Paper, 17 January 2000) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_Japanj.htm>. 
13 Bathurst CJ, ‘Who Judges the Judges, and how should they be judged?’ (2019 Opening of law term address, 
30 January 2019) [45]-[46], [49]-[50]. 
14 Matthew Groves and Russell Smyth, ‘A Century of Judicial Style: Changing Patterns in Judgment Writing on 
the High Court 1903-2001’ (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 255.  
15 Andrew Lynch, ‘The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical Analysis of its First Five Years’ (2003) 
26(1) University of NSW Law Journal 32.  
16 Kirby P stated in Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47, that ‘Justice is done in public so that it 
may be discussed and criticised in public’. 
17 Geoffrey de Q Walker, The rule of law: foundation of constitutional democracy (Melbourne University Press, 
1988). 
18 While its definition may be contested and varied it is part of the Commonwealth Constitution: South 
Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (French CJ) [42]. 
19 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Classics, 8th ed, 1982) 104–273. For 
further discussion see Mark D Walters, ‘Dicey on Writing the Law of the Constitution’ (2012) 32(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 21.  On the much earlier antecedents of the rule of law, see James Spigelman, ‘Magna 
Carta: The Rule of Law and Liberty’ (2015) 31(2) Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas 24 and Friedrich 
Hayek, ‘The Origins of the Rule of Law’ in The Constitution of Liberty  (University of Chicago Press 1960), 162, 
attributing the concept to Aristotle; on political and philosophical foundations of the concept, see Judith 
Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in Allan C Hutchinson and Patrick J Monahan (eds), The Rule of 
Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell, 1987) 1, ch 1.  
20 Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration (1992), 176 CLR 1 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) [38]. 
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The courts themselves are subject to both the aspiration and formality of the rule of law.21 
Open justice, a core principle of the common law,22 renders judicial authority subject to, and 
limited by, the rule of law.  In the English decision, Scott v Scott open justice is reverently 
described by Lord Shaw as ‘…a sound and very sacred part of the constitution of the country 
and the administration of justice’23 and by Lord Atkinson as ‘the best security for the pure, 
impartial and efficient administration of justice’.24  The High Court confirmed these 
sentiments in Dickason v Dickason25 since observing there to be ‘a strong tradition of open 
justice that characterises the courts of this country’26 and that ‘[T]he clear authority of this 
court, of other final courts and of other Australian courts lays consistent emphasis on the fact 
that the principle of open justice is deeply entrenched in our law.’27 
The core principle of open justice is the open court rule. This maintains public confidence in 
the administration of justice by safeguarding against secrecy, allowing the public and the 
media access to courts.   The fact that courts of law are held in public is ‘one of the most 
pervasive axioms of the administration of justice in our legal system’28 and is a long standing 
principle of common law systems.29 The open court rule also ensures records of judicial 
decisions may be accessed by the public.  The High Court’s commitment to the open court 
rule is both operational and jurisprudential. Operationally High Court Justices are accountable 
for their decision making firstly, in public court proceedings and secondly, by the High Court 
Rules 2004 (Cth)30 requiring publication of written reasons for judgment.  Jurisprudentially, 
the High Court has held the open court rule to be fundamental,31 with limits only being placed 
upon the rule only where 'necessary for the administration of justice' or 'in the interests of 
justice'32 or by statutory exception.33  
                                                          
21  Writing some 50 years earlier than AV Dicey, Governor Forbes wrote of the NSW Supreme Court that ‘…the 
judicial office … stands uncontrolled and independent, and bowing to no power but the supremacy of law.’ 
Cited in Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law, The Rule of Law Series (Speech, 7 November 2001) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm#_edn13>. 
22 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506; see generally Beverley McLachlin, ‘Openness and the Rule of Law’ 
(Annual International Rule of Law Lecture, 8 January 2014). 
<https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/270848/jan_8__2014_-_12_pt.__rule_of_law_-
_annual_international_rule_of_law_lecture.pdf>; Right Honorable Beverley McLachlin, The 21st Century 
Courts: Old Challenges and New,  April 28, 2006 (AIJA, 2006).  
23 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, 473 (Lord Shaw). 
24 Ibid, 463 (Lord Atkinson). 
25 (1913) 17 CLR 50. 
26 X v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 226 CLR 630 (Kirby J) [89]. 
27 Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic), Re (2005) 214 ALR 422 (Kirby J) [114]. 
28 Justice Spigelman, ‘Seen to be Done: The Principle of Open Justice’ (Keynote address to the 31st Australian 
Legal Convention, 9 October 1999).  
29 Sir Edward Coke traced this to Statute Of Marlborough 1267, see Edward Coke, The Second Part of Institutes 
of Law of England (London 1642) 103-104. 
30 High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 6.03. 
31 Russell v Russell; Farrellly v Farrelly (1976) 9 ALR 103 (Gibbs J) 122. 
32 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506. The limitations are justified, as the open administration of justice serves 
the interests of society and is not an end in itself: Garth Netheim, ‘Open Justice versus Justice’ (1985) 9(4) The 
Adelaide Law Review 487. 
33 See also Rinehart v Walker [2011] NSWCA 403 and discussion of section 6 of the Court Suppression and Non-
Publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) which include: control of public attendance to protect orderly court 
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However, the application of the open court rule, is limited by the concept of ‘court’ and ‘open 
court’.34 Administrative judicial functions, such as determinations of SLAs, are removed from 
its application. The High Court is empowered to ‘administer its own affairs’ under section 17 
of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth). This self-administration, is a discretionary 
‘collegiate autonomous model’35 of governance. It includes, at least, the assignment of 
Justices to cases and timing of court sittings as well as the court lists, allocation of court rooms 
and the direction of administrative staff engaged in these functions.36  None of these is 
subject to public scrutiny under the open court rule.  
Nevertheless, internal Court administration is exposed to some public scrutiny.  Section 47 of 
the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) requires the Court to produce an Annual Report. 
This public report on the workings of the Court is recognition of the importance of public 
availability of accurate information about its practice and procedures.37  The Court also 
provides extensive information online, much of which is not required by legislation.  For 
example, as discussed below, the Court has, since January 2011, made available on its website 
the written submissions filed on behalf of parties in advance of Full Court appeal hearings.  
This willingness to publish information relevant to internal Court governance is not mandated 
by statute or Court jurisprudence.  It is discretionary.  This raises the difficult issue, discussed 
in Part VI below, as to whether this exercise of discretion which establishes the current levels 
of transparency for SLAs is sufficient.   
This question is made more complex due to the tension High Court self-administration creates 
within the rule of law.  On the one hand judicial self-administration conflicts with open justice 
as the judiciary is exercising an administrative function.38  This can be discretionary and 
secretive. On the other hand, Court self-governance upholds judicial independence leaving 
the judiciary free from Executive interference over significant matters such as the allocation 
of caseloads to individual justices and the development of court procedures and policy.39 This 
independence of the judiciary is traditionally secured by the guarantee that the judiciary will 
                                                          
proceedings; sensitivity to the reputation of trial participants and to protect state security.  Similarly Schedule 
2 of the Access to Justice (Federal Jurisdiction) Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) as to suppression and non-
publication of information. 
34 Russell v Russell (n 31) determined that the open court rule applied to state courts as per Chapter III of the 
Commonwealth Constitution referred to in Williams v Williams   (1976) 134 CLR 495 (Stephen J)  532,  (Barwick 
CJ) 505. Cited with approval in K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, (French CJ) 
[49] discussing state courts and the application of the open court principle. 
35 Tin Bunjevac, ‘Court Governance: The Challenge of Change’ (2011) 20 Journal of Judicial Administration 201. 
36 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch’ (2006) 11 Judicial Review 337 citing the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v The Queen [1985] 2 SCR 673. 
37 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 1997-1998, 7. 
38 There must be separation between executive and judicial functions: Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 
CLR 510 (Gummow and Hayne JJ) 560; Enfield City Council v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 
CLR 135 (Gaudron J) 157. Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law, The Rule of Law Series (7 November 
2001) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm#_edn13>. 
39  Martin (n 5); Justice Bryan Beaumont, ‘The Self-administering Court: from Principles to Pragmatism’ (1999) 
9 Journal of Judicial Administration 61. 
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be publicly accountable through the principles of open justice. As Justice McHugh J observed 
in Grollo v Palmer:40  
The maintenance of public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the 
Federal Court Justices in hearing disputes between the citizen and the government 
and its agencies is contingent upon the public perception that the Justices of the 
federal courts are impartial and entirely independent of the executive arm of 
government.  
Thus competing policy objectives are thrown into sharp relief by Court self-administration. 
Independence from the Executive arm of government with the expense and delay of ensuring 
public accountability through the application of principles of open justice must be pursued by 
the Court against the administrative reality of limited budgets. Managerial efficiency and 
control of a growing workload may best be achieved through closed administrative processes.  
Answering the question as to appropriate levels of transparency over judicial self-
administration is further complicated by the imprecision as to what open justice 
encompasses. The public scrutiny the rule affords is pointless without the machinery 
and manner of the workings of the Court affording litigants a right to be heard with 
equal access to the courts and equality before the law.  It follows that the principle(s) 
of open justice must be broadly construed. Open justice is a collection of principles 
which act as a balance against the countervailing exercise of arbitrary power.41  These 
principles exist together with the open court rule and include: availability of judicial 
review; judicial accountability; integrity of courts; access to court documents and 
fairness. ‘Efficient justice’42 is also an important principle.43 Single justices in the High 
Court refer to ‘the efficient administration of justice’44 and the ‘public interest in the 
timely and efficient administration of civil justice‘45 and of criminal law46 and explain 
the ‘risk of adverse consequences for the efficient administration of justice’ if litigation 
became ‘more lengthy, more complex and more costly.’47 As discussed in Part IV 
efficient justice is the principle driving the judicial administration of SLAs. 
 
III THE EXCEPTIONALISM OF SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL: JUDICIAL POWER AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE   
The breadth and application of open justice principles to Court self-administration is critical 
in analysis of the public availability of SLA information. This is because, as discussed in Part II 
                                                          
40 184 CLR 348 [29].  
41 Kimber v Press Association [1893] 1 QB 65 cited in Emma Cunliffe, ‘Open Justice: Concepts and Judicial 
Approaches’ (2012) Federal Law Review 15, Note 8. 
42 This term is used in the United Kingdom where it is observed as being in tension with open justice, see Lord 
Chief Justice Bingham in SmithKline Beecham Biologies SA v Connaught Laboratories Inc [1999] All ER 498. 
43 The term is not used by the ‘High Court, in Federal Court judgments the term is mentioned briefly in obiter: 
Hinton v Alpha Westmean Private Hospital Pty Ltd (2016) FCAFC 107.  
44 Ebner v Official Trustee in bankruptcy (M131 of 1999) (2000) 176 ALR 644 (Guadron J) [95]. 
45 UBS AG v Tyne (as trustee of the Argot Trust) (2018) 360 ALR 184 (Gageler J) [70], [72]. 
46 Ousley v R (1997) 148 ALR 510 (McHugh J) 534. 
47 Giannarelli & Ors v Wraith & Ors (1988) 81 ALR 417 (Mason CJ) 422. 
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and confirmed below, High Court jurisprudence expressly excludes determinations of SLAs 
from the open court rule.   
This is significant. SLA determinations impact upon the wider legal system. At the apex of 
state and federal courts, the High Court has two principal jurisdictions: as a court of original 
constitutional jurisdiction and as the final appeal court for all Australian jurisdictions in all 
matters.  As finite resources require the High Court to allocate its attentions only to the most 
significant legal questions and the bulk of the High Court’s work is appellate,48 outcomes of 
SLAs will necessarily influence the development of substantive law. This is especially clear in 
the public interest test for special leave to appeal to the High Court in section 35A of 
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). This states that the High Court ‘may have regard to any matters 
that it considers relevant’ but directs the Court that it ‘shall have regard’ to the ‘public 
importance’ of the question of law and whether ‘the interests of the administration of justice, 
either generally or in the particular case, require consideration by the High Court’ [emphasis 
added].  This is a strict test which emphasizes the public interest in the evolution of law and 
the private interests of the parties to the litigation.49 The significance of SLA outcomes to the 
development of substantive law means that the administrative framework applied to select 
cases for hearing is critical to public confidence in the administration of justice.  
The framework for SLA selection is one of both form and function. The form of SLAs is 
prescribed in the High Court Rules.  Significant rule changes were introduced in 2016 to 
decrease delay and costs to parties. As of June 2016 SLAs must be filed within 28 days of the 
judgment being appealed and the form of application is limited to a maximum of 12 pages in 
length. The previous right to request an oral hearing of the SLA (previously in r 41.07.3) has 
been removed. Rule 41.08.1 provides that:  
Any 2 Justices may determine an application without listing it for hearing and direct the 
Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order determining the application.  
The High Court Justices can therefore determine an SLA on the papers in camera without any 
opportunity for the applicant or respondent to present oral argument.50 In the 2017-2018 
year, 77% of SLAs were finalised without an oral hearing.51  
The function of the special leave requirement is twofold.  Firstly, a grant of special leave to 
appeal provides an opportunity for litigants to pursue legal action through to finality while 
simultaneously enabling the High Court to shape the law across State, Territory and Federal 
                                                          
48 The High Court also hears other matters such as applications under section 75(v) of the Constitution against 
officers of the Commonwealth, removals from other courts into the High Court under section 40 of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), cases stated, references under section 18, and election petitions. 
49  Ben Wickham, ‘The Procedural and Substantive Aspects of Applications for Special Leave to Appeal in the 
High Court of Australia’ (2007) 28 Adelaide Law Review 153, 155. 
50 At the same time, the reforms place greater stress on practitioners to prepare a SLA within tightly 
constrained timeframes, and tightly constrained page limits on applications, see Chris Corns, ‘Leave to Appeal 
in Criminal Cases: The Victorian Model’ (2017) 29(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 39. 
51 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2017-2018, 21. 
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jurisdictions.  Secondly, as there is no appeal as of right,52 the High Court controls its own 
workload by filtering SLAs.53   
Importantly whilst this administrative framework is a preliminary step in appellate 
proceedings, the determination of an SLA involves the exercise of judicial power under section 
71 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The High Court held in Smith Kline & French 
Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Commonwealth (‘Smith Kline’): 
The procedure calls for a hearing, whether orally or on written materials, and a 
determination in the form of a curial order. If the application be refused, the order 
dismissing the application is the final curial act which brings the litigation between 
the parties to an end. An application for special leave to appeal therefore involves 
the exercise of judicial power.54 
The Court thus expressly acknowledges that special leave determinations are an exercise of 
judicial power under Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution.  This confirms a 
separation of powers between Court administration of SLAs as a power of the judiciary 
distinct from that of the executive and the legislative arms of government. SLAs, as an exercise 
of judicial power, are therefore part of the larger precept of judicial independence and the 
separation of powers doctrine.  
However the exceptional nature of SLAs as an administrative tool is also emphasized by the 
Court.  High Court jurisprudence concedes workload considerations involved in SLAs. The 
Court observes the determination of an SLA to be not ‘in the ordinary course of litigation’,55 
not resolving a dispute between parties, though it may be the final chapter in the dispute.56 
Again in the joint judgment in Smith Kline the High Court observed: 
From time to time statements have been made which draw attention to the 
unusual character of an application for special leave to appeal. Such an application 
has special features which distinguish it from most other legal proceedings. It is a 
long-established procedure which enables an appellate court to control in some 
measure or filter the volume of work requiring its attention. Ordinarily, it results 
in a decision which is not accompanied by reasons, or particularly by detailed 
reasons.57 
                                                          
52 The provision of appeals as of right was abolished in 1976:  Hon Michael Kirby, ‘Law at Century’s End – A 
Millenial View from the High Court of Australia’ (2001) 1 Macquarie Law Journal 1, 7. Until 1984 litigants to 
appeal in civil matters had a right, as long as their case was of a certain monetary value, see David Solomon, 
‘Controlling the High Court’s Agenda’ (1993) 23 Western Australian Law Review 33.  
53 Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1991) 173 CLR 194; see also Hon Sir 
Anthony Mason, ‘The High Court as Gatekeeper’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 784. 
54 Ibid (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) [36]. 
55 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 (French CJ) [21].  
56 North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595 (McHugh J) 643; Re Sinanovic's 
Application (2001) 180 ALR 448 (Kirby J) 450. The principle of finality of litigation applies to SLAs see Hughes 
Trueman Pty Ltd & Anor v Young [2017] FCCA 468 (Judge Dowdy) [18]. 
57 Smith Kline (n 53) (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) 217-218.  
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Here the High Court acknowledges the exceptionalism of SLAs. While an exercise of judicial 
power, the open court rule does not apply to SLAs. An SLA does not have to be heard in open 
court, the determination of an SLA in private is not a denial of natural justice,58 and reasons 
do not have to be provided.  In fact the absence of the application of the open court rule 
ensures the ‘availability, the speed and the efficiency of justice.’59 SLAs are thus a unique 
blend of efficient administrative process and opaque judicial power. 
IV. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE FOR SLAS: PREFERENCING EFFICIENT JUSTICE   
Efficient justice is important. Administrative efficiency is critical to the rule of law. Complexity, 
expense and delay have been described as the ‘unholy trinity’60 inhibiting access to the justice 
system and leading ultimately to denial of justice.61  Some rationing is necessary.   
High Court litigation is affected by the adoption of managerial judging techniques.62 Of these 
techniques, managing special leave is now the most important consideration in High Court 
efficiency. The major63 amendment enabling filtering of the Court’s work by the requirement 
for special leave was introduced through section 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in 1984. 
This was enacted for the purpose of workload management.64   In Smith Kline65 the High Court 
upheld the constitutional validity of section 35A, ‘inherent in which is the absence of a right 
of appeal to the High Court’.66  The unanimous judgment in Smith Kline observed that the 
High Court has a ‘very wide discretion’ to grant special leave to appeal67 and further, that ‘[i]t 
is not an ordinary court of appeal’.68 This is because the bulk of appellate work is now 
governed by the special leave requirement.69 
                                                          
58 Coulter v R (1988) 164 CLR 350 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ) 356 (‘Coulter’).  
59 Ibid (Deane and Gaudron JJ) 359. 
60 Neil Andrews, ‘A new civil procedural code for England: party-control' going, going, gone' (2000) 19 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 19, 20. 
61 Lord Dyson, ‘Delay too often defeats justice’ (2015) 12(3) Judicial Review, 285-299. 
62  Saunders (n 36).   
63 These amendments began in 1976 when the Judiciary Amendment Act 1976 (Cth) removed appeals as of 
right to the High Court.   
64 Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Inglis (1974) 3 ALR 19 (Barwick CJ and McTiernan J). During the 
second reading speech of the amending legislation (the Judiciary Amendment Bill (No 2) 1984), the Attorney-
General, Senator Gareth Evans, pointed out that the justices of the High Court had expressed concern about 
the effect of the increasing workload of the High Court on its capacity to function effectively as a final 
appellate court in Australia. See Hansard (Sen) 8 March 1984, 584–5 cited in S O’Bryan ‘High Court appeals’ 
(1984) 19 Australian Law News 11, 244. See also, Australian Law Reform Commission, The Judicial Power of the 
Commonwealth:  A Review of the Judiciary Act 1903 and Related Legislation (ALRC Discussion Paper 64) 
December 2000, 242. From its  inception in 1903 the Australian High Court was a court of appeal:  Nicholas 
Aroney, Peter Gerangelos, Sarah Murray, James Stellios, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
(Cambridge University Press), 505 citing JM Bennett, Keystone of the Federal Arch (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1980) 3. 
65 Above (n 53). 
66  Milat v The Queen [2004] HCA 17 (McHugh J) [26]. 
67 Smith Kline (n 53). See also Collins v. The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 120, where the High Court observed that 
‘The jurisdiction which the Court exercises in determining an application for leave is not a proceeding in the 
ordinary course of litigation’ (Mason CJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ) 122 [9]. 
68 Smith Kline (n 53) 218. 
69 See O’Brien (n 3). 
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This was a monumental shift. For most of the last century, the High Court was not an ultimate 
court of appeal given that there were still Australian appeals to the Privy Council.70 At the 
same time, civil litigants could appeal to the High Court virtually as of right. The above 
amendments to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) require that all appellants must have a grant of 
special leave to appeal. Large numbers of SLAs71 mean that the mix of work, between 
substantive law and error correction, is within Court control.  The Court, through refusal of 
SLAs, determines the areas of law it will not reconsider.72 The High Court can and does ‘choose 
the cases which it entertain[s], and thus influence[s] the direction and pace of legal change.’73 
Thus judicial self-administration of SLAs is part of the administration of justice. 
Theoretically, the absence of application of the open court rule to SLAs means  determinations 
are made in secret. However the practice of the High Court ameliorates the effect.  As noted 
in Part III publicly available data is provided by the High Court Annual Reports.  The Court 
voluntarily makes significant amounts of information about its own function, limits and 
internal organisation available to the public on its website.  The website publishes the 
transcripts of applications heard orally and the determinations of applications heard on the 
papers. Where applications are refused on the papers they are accompanied by very short 
formal reasons for refusal, and if granted leave to appeal, no reasons are recorded. By way of 
example, a reason commonly recorded where applications are refused is ‘this appeal would 
not enjoy sufficient prospects of success.’74 This form of statement has been described as 
‘extremely brief’ and ‘often uninformative’, with the brevity due to a ‘crushing’ workload.75 
These brief statements are now the primary source of SLA public information.  The only other 
source of data is that contained in High Court Annual Reports. Appendix 1 details the four 
publicly available sources of information about SLAs.  It provides a snapshot of the impact of 
the 2016 High Court procedural rule changes concerning SLAs. Increasing reliance upon the 
short formal reasons of refusal is largely, although not solely, attributable to the reduced 
number of oral hearings and the corresponding diminution in transcripts of oral hearings. 
Transcripts of oral hearings are the richest source of information about the process and 
deliberations of the High Court under section 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). In 
2017/18, 77% of all SLAs were heard on the papers with a total of 35 grants of special leave 
                                                          
70 Privy Council appeals were abolished in 1986.  
71 In 2005-2006  873 matters filed (720  SLAs); 2006-2007 945 matters ( 809 SLAs);  2007-2008 692 matters 
(575 SLAs); 2008-2009 692 matters (575 SLAs);  2009-2010 680 matters (562 SLAs); 2010-2011 715 matters 
(494 SLAs);  2011-2012 728 matters (487 SLAs);  2012-2013 618 matters (458 SLAs); 2013-2014 630 matters 
(508 SLAs); 2014-2015 698 matters (470 SLAs); 2015-2016 795 matters (536 SLAs).   
72 David Jackson, ‘The Role of the Chief Justice: A View from the Bar’ in Cheryl Saunders (ed), ‘Courts of Final 
Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia’ (Federation Press, 1996) 22. 
73 David Jackson, ‘The Australian Judicial System: Judicial Power of the Commonwealth’ (2001) 24(3) University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 737, [6]. 
74 In 1991 Solomon (n 52) examined 91 cases where the High Court refused special leave in civil matters and 
observed ‘There is little direct correlation between the formal requirements set out in section 35A of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for the grant of special leave and the reasons the Court tends to give for refusing 
special leave.’ This remains the case.  




in 2018: the lowest annual number of grants in the past decade.76 Details of the 35 cases 
granted special leave are publicly accessible via the appeal judgments handed down and 
through online public dissemination of party submissions for the Full Court hearings. Neither 
of these avenues of transparency is available for the SLAs refused. Post 2016 we have 
increasingly scant information about unsuccessful applications especially those determined 
on the papers. 
V. THE PRE-2016 STUDY OF SLAS: ILLUSTRATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN INFORMATION 
ABOUT SLAS  
This Part examines the sources of publicly available information outlined in Appendix 1 with 
particular focus upon the role and function of the Justices. It reports the findings of an analysis 
of a specially constructed data set of SLAs. This study supplements High Court Annual Report 
data through collating all information publicly available on SLAs.  The data set used in this 
study was coded by the authors by hand77 and collated variables defined by the information 
available in the special leave dispositions and transcripts. More than 50 variables were coded 
including legal practice area; application outcome; paper versus oral hearing; court below; 
membership of judicial panels; judicial grant rates, details of parties and legal representation.  
Approximately 40 000 pieces of information were coded.78  
The findings of this study evidence the extent to which SLAs are conducted in public view and 
raise the issue of whether the available information is sufficient to maintain public confidence 
in the administration of justice.  The study findings demonstrate the value of publicly available 
information in providing insights into the challenges of efficient administration of the special 
leave process and the flow of appellate work to the High Court. It also exposes the depth of 
information lost to the public following the 2016 Rule changes due to the consequent rapid 
and significant increase in paper based determinations of SLAs. 
The data set consists of all 783 SLAs disposed of by the High Court between March 2013 and 
February 2015. This time frame was selected for four reasons: firstly, it immediately precedes 
the most recent 2016 High Court rule changes; secondly, it was a period where the 
membership of the High Court remained static;79 thirdly, the number of applications enabled 
the authors to code them manually and finally because the currency of this period provides 
                                                          
76 Jeremy Gans, ‘News: Five new special leave grants bring the yearly total to 35’ (Blog Post, 15 December 
2018) <https://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2018/12/15/news-five-new-special-leave-grants-bring-
the-yearly-total-to-35/>. 
77 The manner of publication of   special leave results meant that machine coding – to the extent required by 
this analysis was not possible. The authors are grateful for the cooperation from the High Court in providing 
available electronic information which formed the basis of its Annual Reports during the period under study.   
78 Analysis of the data was undertaken by the authors with interdisciplinary assistance, with assistance of 
statisticians and data science research students. 
79 Between March 2013 and February 2015 the High Court Justices were French CJ; Kiefel J; Crennan J; Bell J; 
Gageler J; Keane J and Hayne J. 
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access to the publicly available special leave application results published on the High Court 
website80 and the decisions publicly available on AustLII.81   
A  The Study Findings: Justices’ SLA Work 
In this study, 447 of the 783 SLAs (57.08%) were decided on the papers and 336 (42.92%) 
were heard orally.  This is on trend with the growth in paper only determination of SLAs which 
has been steadily evolving since February 1982 when the first steps were taken to adopt a 
‘universal requirement of written submissions’ for SLAs.82  In 2003 the High Court observed 
that written submissions filed by applicants were by then ‘the principal vehicle for 
demonstrating that the case is one in which leave should be given.’83  The increase in paper 
hearings is the culmination of a steady condensation and reduction of oral argument.84  It is 
directed at efficiency.  Following new High Court Rules in 2004 the Court noted that ‘…the 
High Court Rules now provide that the Court may determine special leave applications on the 
papers.... As a consequence of this procedure overall waiting times have been reduced.’85 
During the period of this study none of the 447 SLAs determined on the papers was granted 
leave. The 80 cases (or 10.22% of total cases) granted leave were all heard orally. There is no 
transparent means to explain why this is the case. As Gans observes, ‘[T]he mystery remains 
of how the court distinguishes between such cases [where oral argument would be critical] 
and the many others where no oral hearing is held.’86 As discussed below, the process for 
selection of cases for final appeal to the High Court is, following the 2016 rule changes, with 
the reduction in oral hearings increasingly invisible to the world outside the court.87  
In all 447 applications determined on the papers, only 2 Justices sat.  At oral hearings, either 
2 or 3 Justices presided. This seems to indicate that oral hearings are granted in cases with 
more complex, or more divisive, issues of law, the implication being that the more Justices 
required the more difficult and demanding the legal issues at stake.88 Table 1 shows success 
rates for the 336 SLAs heard orally. It demonstrates a striking reluctance to commit more than 
2 Justices to determine SLAs. Of the 336 oral SLAs only 43 or 12.8% were determined by a 
panel of 3 Justices. 
 
                                                          
80 High Court Website, <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/registry/special-leave-applications-results-2016>. 
81 The four sources used to obtain and cross-check the data:  High Court Bulletins listing applications granted 
and refused (available on High Court website and AustLII); Dispositions (available on High Court website and 
AustLII); SLA transcripts (available on AustLII); High Court lists (available on the High Court website). See 
Appendix One. 
82 Hon Justice Michael Kirby, ‘The future of appellate advocacy’ (2006) 27(2) Australian Bar Review 141. 
83 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2003-2004, 8 (the relevant new rules commenced in January 2005).    
84 In 2005-2006, 50% of SLAs heard on the papers; 2006-2007, more than 50%; 2007-2008, 73%; 2008-2009, 
66%; 2009-2010, 59%; 2010-2011, 50%; 2011-2012, 49%; 2012-2013 53%; 2013-2014, 47%; 2014-2015, 60%;  
2015-2016,  (new rules on 7 June 2016)  65%;  2016-2017, 75%; 2017-2018, 77%. 
85 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2005-2006, 33. See below (89). 
86 Gans (n 76) 3 August 2016.  
87 Meador has observed this process in the United States: Daniel J Meador, ‘Toward Orality and Visibility in the 
Appellate Process’ (1983) 42(4) Maryland Law Review 732, 736. 
88 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Maximising special leave performance in the High Court of Australia’ University of 
New South Wales Law Journal  731, 742. 
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(% of all 
SLAs) Number of Justices  Granted Refused 
2 Justices 72 221 24.57% 293 87.20% 
3 Justices 8 35 18.60% 43 12.80% 
Total 80 256 23.81% 336 100% 
 
Of the successful oral applications Table 1 shows that 18.6% of applications succeed when 
there is a 3 Justice panel as opposed to 24.57% for a 2 Justice panel.  Once both oral and paper 
based determinations are included in the figures for two Justice panels (whether heard orally 
or on the papers), a total of 72 applications, just under 10%, were successful and 90% or 668 
were refused leave.  Where there were three Justices sitting, almost 19% or 8 applications 
were granted leave and 81% or 35 were refused. The type of data used in Table 1 will be 
available and that analysis will be able to be replicated post the High Court 2016 Rule changes. 
 
The number of Justices assigned to a special leave panel is an indication of the resources the 
High Court is willing to commit to the special leave process. SLAs comprise the bulk of matters 
filed in the High Court and the total number of Justices, 7, has remained unaltered as the 
workload has dramatically increased.  Changes to special leave procedures have enabled this 
increase to be managed. Rule changes in 2004 cut sitting days in half by introducing written 
submissions, allowing the Justice panels to reduce from 3 to 2 and enforcing time limits for 
oral argument.89  
Table 2 allows for comparison of the work of judicial panels in oral hearings across the three 
main legal categories of SLAs:   
 
TABLE 2: Oral Hearings: Number of Justices and Outcome, by Practice Area 
 





(% of all 
SLAs) Number of Justices Practice Area  Granted Refused 
2 Justices Civil Law 48 133 26.52% 181 53.87% 
Criminal Law 21 75 21.88% 96 28.57% 
Immigration Law 3 14 17.65% 17 5.06% 
3 Justices Civil Law 5 24 17.24% 29 8.63% 
Criminal Law 2 10 16.67% 12 3.57% 
Immigration Law 1 0 100% 1 0.30% 
 Total SLAs 80 256 23.81% 336 100.00% 
 
                                                          
89 In 2007 Justice Kirby observed that this development had halved the days in the Court sitting year dedicated 




The majority of successful oral applications, be they before 2 or 3 Justices concern civil law.  
This figure differs when all 783 applications (both oral and paper hearings) are accounted for, 
comprising 454 civil matters, 161 criminal matters and 169 immigration matters.90 The 
success rate overall for civil matters was 11.67% compared to 14.29% for criminal matters 
and 2.38% for immigration.91   
The information required for Table 2 will be lost post the 2016 Rule changes as practice area 
is not now disclosed on dispositions for SLAs decided on the papers. While often it is possible 
to deduce information about the general practice area from the names of the parties to the 
case, it is certainly not possible to ascertain from the dispositions a more granular 
classification of practice area. General information about the numbers of cases in practice 
areas overall is, to date, available in the Annual Reports of the High Court but there is no 
breakdown of success rates in individual areas (see Table 6 & 7). 
As Table 2 demonstrates public reporting of the number of Justices sitting on applications, 
and their identity, does provide some assurance, albeit limited, of accountability. At minimum 
it assures the public that determinations must be made through a process of judicial 
consultation. It also facilitates analysis which in turn promotes public understanding of the 
complexity of the judicial role.  
 
This is further illustrated by Table 3 which identifies each Justice and the number of SLAs 
determined, together with the individual Justice’s grant and refusal rate.  This rate is then 
broken down into oral hearings and matters determined on the papers.   
 






















(% of all 
SLAs) Granted Refused 
Bell J 22 232 8.66% 19.30% 254 114 140 32.44% 
Crennan J 19 208 8.37% 24.36% 227 78 149 28.99% 
French CJ 36 80 31.03% 31.03% 116 116 - 14.81% 
Gageler J 23 244 8.61% 21.50% 267 107 160 34.10% 
Hayne J 21 214 8.94% 24.42% 235 86 149 30.01% 
Keane J 21 225 8.54% 19.44% 246 108 138 31.42% 
Kiefel J 26 238 9.85% 24.53% 264 106 158 33.72%     
Total 1609 715 894 32.44 
 
                                                          
90 Immigration is separated from civil law due to the significant numbers of these applications where the 
applicant was self-represented. Accordingly they were almost all determined on the papers. 




The information in Table 3 remains available post 2016 however the sense of the role of the 
Chief Justice will be lost due to the decline in the number of oral hearings. In our study Chief 
Justice French was a member of the bench for the most oral hearings.  Atkins has observed, 
in the context of the United States Supreme Court, that the role of the Chief Justice deserves 
attention in any examination as to how a court uses its resources and power.92 As Table 3 
shows Chief Justice French sat on 116 of the 336 oral hearings.  The Chief Justice also had the 
highest grant rate with special leave granted in 31.03% of matters determined by a panel that 
included the Chief Justice.  Justice Kiefel was the next highest leave granter in oral hearings 
(24.53%).  Justices Bell and Keane had the lowest rates of granting special leave in oral 
hearings at 19.30% and 19.44%, respectively. Justice Bell sat on only 2 fewer oral hearings 
than Chief Justice French: 114 hearings. Table 3 shows when matters determined on the 
papers are included, Justice Gageler had the greatest load sitting on 34.10% of all applications.   
Conversely Chief Justice French had a comparatively lower judicial participation rate owing to 
his absence from any panels that considered applications ‘on the papers.’ . The involvement 
of the Chief Justice in only oral hearings and the fact that it was only from oral hearings that 
grants of special leave were made supports the view that the role of the Chief Justice in the 
Australian context deserves close scrutiny.  
The number and identity of Justices allocated to a special leave application panel, is 
discretionary. The High Court Justices exercise administrative independence over rostering 
and case management. 93   There is no published explanation as to firstly, how the number of 
Justices (2 or 3) is chosen to sit on special leave panels or secondly, why particular Justices 
are selected and finally, how applications are selected for oral hearing rather than 
consideration on the papers.94  There is limited insight offered extra-judicially as to judicial 
panel allocations. Justice Kirby, as he then was, observed that the practices of individual 
justices vary and that the assignment of Justices to special leave panels is proposed by the 
Chief Justice.95  His Honour states that the recommendation as to ‘whether two or three 
Justices should participate in a particular application … is done by reference to a preliminary 
study of the subject matter raised by the applications.’96 It may indicate the level of 
complexity of the case or the level of interest individual Justices have in an issue. Justice Kirby 
observed that at times justices may sit in a special leave application because of particular 
interest.97   
There is no evidence that the choice of Justice influences SLA outcomes.  However there is 
international scholarship on the importance and influence of the choice of Justices on 
substantive legal proceedings.98 The High Court internal process of panel selection with an 
                                                          
92  Burton M Atkins, ‘Alternative Models of Appeal Mobilization in Judicial Heirarchies’ (1993) 37(3) American 
Journal of Political Science 780.   
93 This role is performed by the Justices themselves and not the officers of the Court or clerks:  Ibid 738. 
94 There are exceptions to this – such as the rules around self-represented litigants. 
95 Kirby (n 88) 18-20. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Marco Febri and Philip M Langbroek, ‘Is there a Right Judge for each case? A Comparative Study of Case 
Assignment in Six European Countries’ (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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absence of transparency may be contrasted with case allocation systems used in other 
jurisdictions, such as Germany and the United States where objective neutral case allocation 
criteria are imposed including judicial rotation.99 Butler explains it is vitally important for the 
maintenance of the rule of law that the public have confidence that they have ‘not lost a case 
because of decisions made to appoint a particular judges or judges to the case in order to 
produce a particular result.’100 While the assignment of Justices to final appellate hearings, 
may be of critical import to outcomes, the present study does not evidence that this is the 
case with respect to SLA determinations.101  
Tables 4 and 5 confirm the SLA grant rate of individual Justices. Again, similarly to Table 3, this 
information is now impossible to replicate as special leave dispositions do not provide 
information as to legal practice areas.  Table 4 shows percentage grant rates by individual 
justices across all practice areas.   
 
 
TABLE 4:  Oral and Paper Hearings: Justices Grant rates by Practice area 
 
Civil Law Criminal Law Immigration Law 
























Bell J 7.80 16.42 14.29 21.95 4.00 33.33 
Crennan J 11.72 27.27 5.41 10.53 3.23 50.00 
French CJ 32.88 32.88 31.25 31.25 18.18 18.18 
Gageler J 9.87 22.06 11.48 18.92 1.85 50.00 
Hayne J 10.24 24.07 16.33 25.81 0.00 0.00 
Keane J 9.80 22.39 10.20 13.51 2.27 25.00 
Kiefel J 11.18 27.69 15.22 21.88 1.75 11.11 
 
While Justice Crennan had the lowest overall rate of grants of SLAs at 8.37%, when each 
practice area is examined Justice Crennan had the second highest rate of granting special 
leave for civil cases.  The only Justice granting special leave more often was Chief Justice 
French. Table 5 shows that both Justice Crennan and Chief Justice French were most likely to 
grant special leave in civil law applications whereas Justices Bell and Hayne granted the most 
                                                          
99 Petra Butler, ‘The Assignment of Cases to Justices’ (2003) 1 New Zealand Journal of Public and International 
Law 83, 84. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Also discretionary is the work practice of individual Justices: some Justices have their associates prepare 
memoranda on special leave cases. Andrew Leigh, ‘Behind the Bench: Associates in the High Court of Australia’ 
(2000) 25(6) Alternative Law Journal 295, 296. Kirby J notes that this is an individual Justices preference that he 
never followed: see Kirby (n 88) 18-20. 
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special leave in criminal law applications. Justice Bell having a background in criminal law102 
may sit on more criminal applications by choice (though this is speculative). 
Table 4 does not explain judicial motivation or behaviour. The outcomes presented ‘are not 
an end in themselves but are intended to present a foundation for more detailed 
consideration’.103  To be instructive this data would need to be compared with a larger data 
set that would include the frequency of the grant of special leave in all years by all Justices 
and the outcomes of those cases on appeal. Nevertheless conclusions drawn may not be free 
from bias. In particular, analysis of legal data may overlook or discount fundamental legal 
values such as justice and fairness.  In any event such analysis goes beyond the scope of the 
present paper. Table 4 is of interest as an example of questions raised by public scrutiny of 
judicial self-administration of special leave applications.   
 
Table 5 provides an example of pre-2016 transparency of judicial panel combinations and 
applications granted or refused.  It would only be possible to replicate Table 5 in a limited 
form today because of the reduction in oral hearings which will reduce triple Justice panels 
and decrease transparency as to the role of the Chief Justice.  
 
TABLE 5: Justice Combinations (Oral & Paper Hearings), Number of SLAs, by Outcome 
 
                                                          
102 Kathy Mack, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Anne Wallace, ‘Caseload Allocation and Special Judicial Skills: Finding 
the ‘Right Judge’?’ (2012) Internal Journal for Court Administration 1, referring to lower court caseload 
allocation and specializations.  








Table 5 is not about workload. It is about panel combinations. It shows the grant and refusal 
rate of judicial combinations.  When examining the numerical count for the ‘top’ three 
combinations the workload rate is equitable and the grant/refusal rate is consistent. The 
three highest combinations to refuse civil law matters were Justices Bell and Gageler (refused 
10.34% granted none), Justices Hayne and Crennan (refused 9.45% and granted 0.52%) and 
Justices Keane and Kiefel (refused 11.37% and granted 0.77%).  The same combinations of 
Justices also had the largest refusal rate for criminal matters:  Justices Bell and Gageler 
(refused 3.58% and granted 0.26%); Justices Hayne and Crennan (refused 2.3% and granted 
0.13%); and Justices Keane and Kiefel (refused 2.17% and granted 0.26%). It is a slightly 
changed order for immigration matters: Justices Hayne and Crennan (refused 7.41% and 
granted none); Justices Bell and Gageler (refused 5.62% granted none); and Justices Keane 
and Kiefel (refused 5.24% and granted none).   We cannot find an obvious reason as to why 
these judicial combinations appear frequently together, for example comparative judicial 
seniority does not seem relevant.104  
 
Tables 6 and 7 detail the oral hearings in each legal practice area (Table 6) and where relevant, 
the duration of oral and video link hearings in each area (Table 7).  The post-2016 decrease in 
oral hearings and the absence of similar information being available for paper determinations 
will make this analysis impossible to replicate.  Given that there will be fewer oral hearings, a 
researcher will need to trace the proceedings back to the intermediate State, Territory or 
Federal court to isolate the relevant legal practice area. 
 
 
TABLE 6: Categories of case with numbers of oral hearings 
 
 
Practice area Oral hearings 
of SLAs in 
category 
Administrative law 
(including discrimination law) 
23   
Admiralty 1 
Banking & finance 2 




                                                          
104 Keane J (2013); Gageler J (2012); Bell J (2009); Kiefel J (2007); Crennan J (2005); Hayne J (1997); but see 
explanation of Kirby J (n 88). 
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Civil procedure 14 
Companion Animals Act 1 
Competition law 5 
Constitutional law 5 
Consumer law NIL 
Contract 19 
Corporations law  11 
Criminal law 107 
Damages NIL 
Equity 13 
Estate law 2 
Evidence  3 
Family law 2 
Extradition 2 
Immigration law 18 
Industrial law 13 
Insurance Law  3 
Intellectual property 7 
Judicial Process  NIL 
Land & Environment( EPA) 1 
Landlord & Tenant NIL 
Legal Practitioners  2 
Local Government Law   NIL 
Property law (including native 
title) 
7 
Personal Property  NIL 
Procedural Fairness NIL 
Social Security NIL 
Statutory interpretation 15 
21 
 
Succession  NIL 
Taxation 19 
Tort 36 
Wills  NIL 




Table 6 does raise more questions than it answers. For example Criminal Law SLAs at 107 oral 
hearings far outnumbered the next closest category of Tort Law with 36 and then 
Administrative Law with 23.  While speculative, the principles of liberty at stake in criminal 
matters and the fairness of hearing oral submissions on behalf of a prisoner may operate in 
the selection of these matters for oral hearing. How this satisfies the public interest test in 
section 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) is not addressed in the transcripts of the hearings.  
 
Table 7 builds from Table 6 and shows the time taken by the Justices to determine oral 
hearings in person and through video link. It will not be possible to replicate the analysis in 
Table 7 with paper determinations where no duration of deliberation time is recorded on 

























































Table 7 evidences the duration of oral determinations. Table 7 confirms that individual SLAs 
are given due consideration (although the ‘duration’ measures submission time as well as 
judicial questioning and reasoning).  If duration equates to complexity and depth of 
deliberation, then Table 7 also provides some indication of the gravitas accorded to SLAs by 
the Court.  Analysis of the study’s data evidences the longer an oral hearing the more likely 
the matter is to be granted leave to appeal.  Indicating perhaps that the more complex 
matters will be granted leave to appeal. Longer hearings also indicate the Court may be 
engaged with both sides legal representatives. The data shows that video link hearings are 
shorter on average than ‘in person’ hearings across both Criminal Law and Civil Law practice 
areas, irrespective of outcome. In contrast, the average duration of Video linked hearings for 
Immigration Law exceeds ‘in person’ hearings.  Only one Immigration Law case was heard via 
video link during the two year period.105  
 
The information in Table 7, as evidence of the administration of justice, will be lost as paper 
based determinations become the primary means of SLA determination. There is no record 
kept of the duration of paper based determinations and thus no hint of the time taken to 
consider SLAs or evidence as to what main legal issues concerned the Court in any particular 
case.  This material is only available in the transcripts of oral proceedings. 
 
Tables 1-7 demonstrate the data analysis possible from the written and oral hearings of SLAs 
pre the 2016 rule changes. Pender describes the 2016 Rule changes as a ‘cloak of secrecy 
[that] has been imposed upon the process, limiting transparency and imposing barriers to 
informed scrutiny.’106 Studies of the judicial administration of High Court SLAs are rare107 and 
Pender’s point is prescient.  While this study extends the existing scholarship of academics,108 
journalists,109 court personnel,110 former and current High Court Justices111 and 
practitioners112 who have written on the process of special leave to appeal to the High Court, 
                                                          
105 Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2013] HCTrans 240.   
106 Kieran Pender, ‘The ‘Price’ of Justice?: Costs-Conditional Special Leave in the High Court’ (2018) 42(1) 
Melbourne University Law Review 149, 187. 
107 As the former High Court Chief Justice Gleeson observes ‘[O]ne of the most important issues facing the 
Court concerns applications for special leave to appeal. This is a topic that is of keen interest to legal 
practitioners and other Justices, but appears to be off the radar screen of most commentators.’ The Hon. 
Murray Gleeson, ‘The High Court of Australia: Challenges for its New Century’ (2004 Constitutional Law 
Conference, 20 February 2004).  
108  Gans (n 76), post 16 March 2016 ‘News: Court announces fewer oral hearings for special leave 
applications’; Luke Beck, ‘The Constitutional Duty to Give reasons for Judicial Decisions’ (2017) 40 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 293. 
109 Pelly (n 10).  
110  Wickham (n 49); Denise Wybury, ‘Self-represented Litigants in the High Court of Australia: A statistical 
Analysis’ (AIJA Conference, 15-17 April 2014).  
111 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The regulation of Appeals to the High Court of Australia: The Jurisdiction to Grant 
Special Leave to Appeal’ (1996) 15(1) University of Tasmania Law Review 1; Justice Geoffrey Nettle, 
‘Applications for Special Leave in Tax Matters’ (Tax Bar Association Annual Dinner, 29 October 2015); Justice 
Hayne, ‘Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia’  (The Victorian Bar – 
Continuing Legal Education, 22 November 2004); Kirby (n 52). 
112 Solomon (n 52); DF Jackson, ‘Practice in the High Court of Australia’ (1996-1997) 15 Australian Bar Review 
187; Maree Kennedy, ‘Applications for Special Leave to the High Court’ (2005) 1 High Court Quarterly Review 1; 
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it is now impossible to replicate without recourse to extraneous information. As there are 
fewer oral hearings of SLAs and the written submissions are not published, the result is less 
publicly available information about SLAs at this point in history than ever before.113 
 
VI. TRANSPARENCY: ‘RE-BALANCING’ EFFICIENT JUSTICE AND OPEN JUSTICE  
 
There is no greater danger of usurpation [of open justice] than that which 
proceeds little by little, under cover of rules of procedure, and at the instance 
of judges themselves.114  
 
The High Court is not required, either by legislation or its own jurisprudence, to make 
information concerning SLAs publicly available. 115   Any call for transparency is based upon 
common law concepts of the rule of law and principles of open justice.  
 
The difficulty is that open justice principles are applied against historical changes in Court 
practice. The discretionary self-administered selection of matters to be heard by a Court was 
not envisaged in Jeremy Bentham’s call for judicial transparency stating, ‘[P]ublicity is the very 
soul of justice...’116 Bentham was of course not referring to judicial self-administration, but to 
‘the authentic hall-mark of judicial, as distinct from administrative, procedure’.117 Therein lies 
the conundrum.  As observed in Part II the public requires certainty that the judiciary is 
‘impartial and entirely independent of the executive arm of government’118  when making 
special leave determinations yet court self-administration is a ‘special function’ of courts119 
requiring the judiciary to perform an executive task.120  High Court self-administration is not 
                                                          
JGS, ‘Practice Note:  High Court Appeals – Objections to competency and applications for special leave to 
appeal’ (1982) 56 The Australian Law Journal 608; O’Brien (n 3); Bennett (n 64). 
113 As to loss of information such as the nature of the parties and their legal representation see Part 41 
inserted by High Court Amendment (2016 Measures No. 1) Rules 2016 (Cth) and Stewart (n 11).  For example, 
the only record of self-representation will now be the Annual Reports which record only the number of self-
represented applicants as a percentage of all applicants or where a SLA is heard orally: the High Court Annual 
Report 2016-17 (Canberra, 2017), 21 recorded that 42% of SLAs during 2016-17 were filed by self-represented 
litigants. 
114 Scott (n 23) (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline), commenting on the growing tendency of the Court to hear cases in 
camera.   
115 SLAs are not alone in this debate, the tension between efficient justice and open justice has been discussed 
with respect to the preparation of skeleton arguments, and Justices pre-reading material before the hearing, 
see Lord Bingham CJ later in SmithKline Beecham Biologicals Special Advocate v Connaught Laboratories [1999] 
4 All ER 498, 511-512. 
116 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Bentham’s Draught for the Organisation of Judicial Establishments, Compared with That 
of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same’, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, v.4 (1843) 316. 
117 McPherson v McPherson (1976) 9 ALR 103, 123; Farrellly v Farrelly (1976) 9 ALR 103 (Gibbs J) 122. 
118 Grollo (n 40) (McHugh J) [29] (commenting upon the judicial exercise of police powers).  
119 Richard Mohr, Helen Gamble, Ted Wright and Brendan Condie, ‘Performance Measurement for Australian 
Courts’ (1996) 6 Journal of Judicial Administration 156;  Aaron Patrick, ‘Federal Court not Above Public 
Scrutiny’ Australian Financial Review (/11/2018);  Justice Michael Moore, ‘Judicial Independence: Breaking 
Free from the Executive Branch’ (2010) Federal judicial Scholarship 27.  
120 It has been the subject of a large amount of literature: Justice Smith, ‘Court Governance and the Executive 
Model’ The Judicial Conference of Australia, Colloquium 2006, Canberra (see Footnote 31 and Appendix C). 
This balance is also managed in a variety of ways, such as by the judicial adoption of guidelines: Guidelines for 
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subject to the open court rule, nor should it be. Nonetheless, according to the rule of law and 
the operational rules and jurisprudence of the Court itself, the machinery of the Court must 
be subject to some public scrutiny.  The question is how much? What is the appropriate level 
of information provision which will satisfy both the requirement of public administration of 
justice and the need for Court efficiency?  
The task then is to find a solution providing a desirable balance to satisfy both efficiency and 
the traditional values of open justice.  We begin from the proposition that this balance will 
not be maintained if full public transparency, with written reasons justifying the dismissal of 
SLAs, is required. Here, while we agree with Cooney,121 who has urged the Canadian Supreme 
Court to supply written reasons in SLAs, that full transparency has value, we believe that this 
would inevitably adversely impact Court time and efficiency.  These practical concerns are 
dismissed by Cooney as ‘hypothetical and are not in and of themselves sufficient to justify the 
fact that the Court provides no reasons for granting leave to appeal.’122 However the 
Australian context differs, given that (as discussed in Part III) the express aim of the Court is 
to promote efficient justice. Chief Justice Kiefel observed in the 2017 High Court decision, 
Mercanti v Mercanti that the 2016 special leave rule changes mean that   ‘…determination of 
such applications is able to be made more expeditiously by this Court’.123  Expeditious 
determination is not conducive to the production of written reasons and oral hearings which 
are the kernels of the open court rule.  Indeed in the Australian context there is no 
constitutional requirement for written reasons for SLAs. Here we disagree with Beck who 
argues that the absence of reasons for SLA determinations is unconstitutional.124 Beck 
suggests that the Court has a constitutional duty to give reasons because SLAs are judicial 
decisions.  As discussed above, SLAs have not been viewed by the Court as judicial decisions, 
though they are an exercise of judicial power.  In this way, they are ‘unusual’ and accordingly 
we reject that such a constitutional requirement exists. In short we see the issue of public 
availability of SLA information as arising from Court practice, its jurisprudence and the 
requirements of the rule of law but we do not find justification for full written reasons for 
SLAs.  
As discussed in Part III a SLA is exceptional.  It is set apart from other judicial proceedings as 
it is an exercise of judicial power and ‘…it involves the exercise of an extremely wide judicial 
discretion.’125 Yet, this discretion must encompass the public interest element that is a 
statutory criterion for the grant of special leave. Legal error in a court below is alone not 
sufficient for a grant of special leave.126  It is therefore reasonable to view the determination 
of special leave as an issue for the administration of justice as well as the self-administration 
                                                          
Communications and Relationships between the Judicial Branch of Government and the Legislative and 
Executive Branches 2014 cited in The Hon French CJ, ‘The State if the Australian Judicature’ (2017) 13(2) 
Judicial Review 153. 
121 Denise Cooney, ‘An Absence of Reason: Why the Supreme Court of Canada Should Justify Dismissing 
Applications for Leave to Appeal’ (2012) 70 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 41. 
122 Ibid, 48. 
123 [2017] HCA 1, [10]. 
124 Luke Beck, <https://auspublaw.org/2017/11/high-court-special-leave-decisions/> (Blog Post, 20/11/2017); 
Beck (n 107). 
125 Coulter (n 60) (Deane and Gaudron JJ) 359-360. 
126  Mason (n 53).  
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of the Court. The Court’s own categorisation of an SLA determination as an exercise of judicial 
power underscores this point. 
There is international support for the limited release of information as to special leave 
determinations. The Anglo-Commonwealth counterparts for the High Court, the Canadian 
and English Supreme Courts determine leave to appeal applications on the papers - by panels 
of 3 Justices.  The Canadian Supreme Court, determines applications without giving reasons, 
although it supplies a list of documents presented to the Court and publishes conditions of 
access to records. The United Kingdom Supreme Court gives brief, formulaic reasons for every 
dismissed application for leave to appeal.127In the Canadian context the Supreme Court has 
experienced a trajectory similar to that of the Australian High Court with respect to the 
manner in which applications are managed and determined.128 The Canadian Supreme Court 
has near complete control over its own docket and has introduced administrative and 
procedural changes echoing those of the High Court.  It is interesting that   the Supreme Court 
has introduced a series of broad measures to increase public accessibility and knowledge of 
its role and to expand media access. 129 This public engagement perhaps highlights the 
absence of transparency or ‘silence’130 of Canadian special leave applications.  It suggests also 
that there is value in the significant transparency measures the Australian High Court already 
offers outside curial proceedings.131 
The exceptionalism of SLAs calls for a level of transparency neither as broad as the open court 
rule nor as restricted as a complete absence of published information. Importantly, as Doogue 
et al observe ‘... the appropriate level of detail to be divulged will depend on the nature of 
the administrative information’.132 We suggest that the nature of SLAs – as both an 
administrative function and an exercise of judicial power - requires more public information 
than currently provided. This is not a call for data for the sake of data. 133  Rather this call to 
increase public information about SLAs within the jurisprudential framework articulated by 
the court itself.  As the Court’s work becomes more complex and more onerous, judicial self-
                                                          
127 Established by Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and which came into being in 2009  Under the 
Supreme Court Practice Direction no 3 Applications for Permission to Appeal  Rule 3.3.3 states that ‘The 
reasons given for refusing permission to appeal should not be regarded as having any value as a precedent’. 
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administration is foregrounded134 and justice has become increasingly less visible.  The Tables 
in Part V evidence the loss of information that results from increased efficiency.  
 
However we also do not advocate a return to the pre-2016 levels of information. Rather we 
propose an increase in transparency. Given the significance of SLAs to both the workload of 
the Court and to the development of substantive law, a return to the information available 
when we undertook our study (2013-2015) is not proportionate to balancing the need for 
transparency with the requirements of administrative efficiency. While our study provides 
insight into SLA determinations between 2013 and 2015, the compilation of that data was the 
result of painstaking and time-consuming collection of information that can neither be 
replicated by machine learning nor otherwise quickly produced.  
 
Therefore to promote both efficient justice and open justice, and to recognise the 
exceptionalism of SLAs, we suggest online publication of SLA written submissions. Specifically, 
public access should be given to the maximum 12 page submission which must be provided 
to the High Court by the parties under Rule 41.01.3.  This call is based upon the current 
practice of the Court with respect to publication of the written submissions filed on behalf of 
parties which is already available on the High Court website in advance of Full Court 
hearings.135 Part 1 of each of these published submissions contains a Certification that ‘the 
submission is in a suitable form for publication on the Internet.’ It will also contain the outline 
of oral argument where relevant, and that too must be certified as suitable for internet 
publication. The same certification could be required for SLAs.  
 
The benefit of this approach is to serve the Court’s two ‘publics’:136 the citizenry as a whole 
and the individuals who interact with courts, from litigants to lawyers. It will benefit the 
former by enhancing public confidence in the judicial process and the latter by clarifying and 
making available for scrutiny an important component of the Court’s work. Plus it will allow 
legal practitioners to provide more informed advice to clients as to the prospects of success 
of an SLA. The written submissions provide a rich source of information about the type of 
case, the parties, their lawyers, the area of law, the issues in question etc.  Because the SLA 
submissions will give insight into the main issues in the proposed appeal and the arguments 
of the parties they will provide both ‘publics’ with a means of scrutinising the judicial 
administration of the Court. Of course they would not give any indication of the reasons for 
the Court’s decision on the grant or refusal of leave which is also the case at present.   
 
Access to written submissions is not novel.  As noted above, subject to privacy or other 
interests which may require suppression, the Court makes available party submissions in 
advance of Full Court hearings. Further, in the Federal Court, a person can search and inspect 
documents specified in the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth)—such as applications, pleadings, 
judgments, orders and submissions—unless the court or a judge has ordered that the 
                                                          
134 It is perhaps instructive that the very first reported decision of the High Court concerned special leave to 
appeal. Dalgarno v Hannah 1 CLR 1; [1903] HCA 1 records a motion to rescind an order granting special leave 
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the manner of Court work such a level of public information is unthinkable and unworkable. 
135 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/cases-heard.>. 
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document is confidential.137 It has also been proposed in legislation in NSW, where the still 
not proclaimed Open Court Information Act 2010 (NSW) would allow access to originating 
process, pleadings, written submissions, transcripts of open court proceedings, statements 
and affidavits admitted into evidence, record of judgment given and any direction or order 
made in proceedings.  
Our suggestion will impact Court resources.  More material posted online is more work. 
However there may be efficiency benefits. Understanding the practices associated with 
applications for special leave assists with public appreciation of the judicial process and 
facilitates understanding of the complexity and broad scope of matters which the Court 
must resolve.  In addition to the interests of the wider community in open justice,138 
increased transparency of SLAs benefits litigants and the legal community and promotes 
certainty.  If it can be determined prior to filing proceedings that a matter is unlikely to 
be granted leave to appeal, this will save litigants and the Court time and money. In 
terms of the development of law and the legal community, great interest rests in the 
selection of cases for appellate hearing, given that the Court directs the nature and pace 
of legal change through selection of the cases for appellate hearing.  
Finally, the interest of the public in having party submissions available is verifiable.  The 
High Court noted the increase in website traffic following the 2011 online publication 
of the written submissions for Full Court hearings:139  
The Court has since January 2011 made available on the Court’s website the written 
submissions filed on behalf of the parties in advance of Full Court hearings.  It is hoped 
that the publication of submissions will assist people interested in following the legal 
argument in cases and provide a broader picture of the Court’s work. 
This resource has proved popular, with a total of 138, 939 hits on the cases index pages 
in the period.  The individual case pages where the written submission are loaded account 
for 22 per cent of the Court’s website usage. 
This increase in public attention would seem to support the oft stated expression that ‘justice 
should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.140 The 
availability and public interest in the online publication of written submissions secures public 
confidence in the courts and the law.  As management of SLAs is now critical for Court 
administration, the requirement of transparency becomes more pressing.  The shift in the 
significance of SLAs is a fundamental change in the ‘…character of the Court’s every 
business’.141 Courts change, times change and the concept of open justice is not frozen in 
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time.142 We suggest that the publication of party submissions for SLAs, which form the bulk 
of judicial self-administration, will promote judicial accountability, public confidence and the 
rule of law.  
 
VII CONCLUSION  
Open justice is expensive.  It is also time consuming and often inconvenient. Resolve is 
demanded to defend it against incursion.  Over the latter part of the 20th century Anglo-
Commonwealth communities have demanded of both government and private corporations 
increased efficiency in the utilisation of available resources, both fiscal and human. Courts are 
not immune from such demands. Judges, court administrators and lawyers must accept new 
burdens and modify existing practices to ensure that available resources are efficiently used.  
SLAs illustrate how managerial efficiency may conflict with public administration of justice.  
Whereas the open court rule has the virtue that judicial proceedings are held in public, with 
written reports, so that judicial behaviour can be analysed and thus subject to the rule of law, 
there is no such requirement of the discretionary administrative decision-making in 
determination of SLAs. Administrative efficiency is the justification for the determination of 
SLAs with limited public scrutiny. 
The argument made in this article is that the data findings of the 2013-2015 SLA study support 
the need for increasing public scrutiny of judicial self-administration.  The data findings 
demonstrate the outer limits of the publicly available information on SLAs with respect to the 
manner of Court work prior to the 2016 Rule changes.  This information was publicly available 
yet is also the result of a systematic research project which coded and collated and analysed 
the data over several years of labour.  Even this level of information is now unavailable 
following the 2016 changes to the High Court rules.  The challenges the authors experienced 
in collecting and analysing the information together with the declining public dissemination 
of information due to the reduction in oral hearings following the 2016 Rule changes confirm 
that open justice is diminishing as administrative efficiency improves.  
Open justice maintains public confidence in the integrity and independence of the courts. Our 
argument is not that the open court rule should apply in full rigour to special leave 
determinations but rather that enough information be supplied to ensure a appropriate level 
of public and professional scrutiny of the determination of SLAs.  Given this function is one of 
the most demanding and time consuming tasks of High Court judicial self-administration we 
advocate public scrutiny for confidence in the administration of justice. The same rule of law 
based approach the High Court adopts in substantive appeal determinations should be 
applied to the grant or dismissal of applications for special leave to appeal.  Yet, the 
exceptionalism of SLAs must be acknowledged. We argue that to meet the objectives of open 
and efficient justice, and thus facilitate the rule of law, the written submissions of all SLAs 
should be made publicly available. 
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Sources of Data about the SLA Work of the 
High Court Before 2016 Rule Changes 
 After 2016 Rule Changes 
Transcripts of Oral Hearings of SLAs 
 
These comprise the richest data source 
about applications with details of  parties, 
suit numbers, presiding justices, 
lawyers/representation, nature of case, 
main issues considered for SLA, hearing 
length (& whether video link), judicial 
engagement/questions to counsel, oral 
submissions, result, brief reasons in the 
event of refusal of leave, details of any costs 
order. 
Where the numbers of oral hearings of SLAs 
are reduced there is a correlating significant 
reduction in the available data concerning 
all aspects of applications for special leave 
to appeal. 
 
Between 53% and 35% 
SLAs were heard orally with 
published transcripts of 
hearings available online.  
 
Figures as follows from HCA 
Annual Reports: 
 
2013/14: 47% of SLAs 
determined on the papers 
  
2014/15: 60% of SLAs 
determined on the papers 
  
2015/16: 65% of SLAs 
determined on the papers 
 
 
A very significant reduction 
in numbers of SLAs heard 
orally with transcripts 
published. 
Only Between 23% and 
25% SLAs heard orally. 
Figures as follows from 
HCA Annual Reports: 
2016/17:  75% of SLAs 
determined on the papers. 
2017/18:  77% of SLAs 
determined on the papers. 
 
Special Leave Dispositions (Publication of 
Reasons and Pronouncement of Orders) in 
respect of SLAs dealt with on the papers.  
These offer very limited data about the 
applications: names of Justices presiding, 
date of disposal, parties’ names, suit 
number, brief formal reasons in the case of 
refusal and formal direction to the Registrar 
concerning orders including costs order if 
appropriate. There may in some instances 
be a reference to the Court below from 
whose orders the appeal is sought. 
There is no information as to the nature of 
the case or the issues raised by the 
application or the matters that were 
influential in the Panels' decisions to 
refuse/grant special leave. 
 
Between 2013 and 2016 
between 47% and 65% SLAs 
heard on the papers with 
Dispositions published.  
 Between 2016 and 2018, 
75%-77% SLAs heard on 





High Court Bulletins.  
These are published monthly on the HCA 
website and contain details of all cases dealt 
with (including appeals handed down, 
decisions reserved, original jurisdiction 
matters and SLAs). The Bulletins include 
details of cases granted Special Leave and 
cases refused leave. 
In the case of applications granted special 
leave the Bulletin provides details of the 
names of parties; HCA suit number; link to 
the HCA transcript of hearing if there was a 
hearing); the court below; medium neutral 
citation to the judgment below.  
The entries in respect of Applications 
granted leave also include "Catchwords" 
detailing the legal category of case and the 
main issues in the application. 
In the case of applications refused special 
leave, available information is limited to 
names of parties; HCA suit number; court 
below with medium neutral citation to 
the judgment below and the SLA result with 




The rule changes have had 
no impact on the 
availability of information 
via the Bulletins. But there 
is no guarantee that the 
HCA will continue to 
publish Bulletins or that 
they will comprise the 
same level of detail as at 
present. 
High Court Results of SLAs Listed for 
Determination or for Hearing. 
 These are published on the HCA website by 
reference to date and place of 
determination or hearing "as soon as 
possible after the applications conclude." 
These are published lists of all SLAs dealt 
with. The information concerning each SLA 
is scant comprising names of parties, HCA 
suit number, Court below with a medium 
neutral citation for the judgment below (in 




The Rule changes have had 
no impact on the 
publication of results of 
SLAs. But there is no 
guarantee that the HCA 
will continue to publish the 
Lists. 
 
 
